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IN PURSUIT OF RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: DOES SELFDETERMINATION MATTER?
YOUNGJIN JUNG*
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the U.S.-led "coalition of willing"' invaded Iraq and toppled the
Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq has effectively been under the control of the
Coalition forces.2 One can argue that the Iraqi territory is under belligerent
occupation pursuant to international law.? As an occupying power, the United
States and its allies are vigorously attempting to reconstruct Iraq and eradicate the
sources of threat to international peace and security.4 Among politicians and
academics around the world, the legality of the war in Iraq was perhaps the single
most controversial issue in the year 2003. 5 States opposing the attack on Iraq
invoked the principles of the U.N. Charter,6 while those supporting the cause of the
war based their arguments on numerous U.N. Security Council7 resolutions and the
* Partner with Woo, Yun, Kang, Jeong & Han (Seoul, Korea). LL.M, JSD, Seoul National University
College of Law; LL.M, JSD, Yale Law School. He is a member of both Korean and New York Bar
Associations. He was associated with Steptoe & Johnson (Washington, DC) and taught at Georgetown
Law School. He also worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and regularly advises the
Korean government on international trade issues. He is very grateful to invaluable comments from
Dong Soo Chung, Esq. and Jun-Shik Whang. He can be reached at yjjung@wooyun.co.kr
1. See Steve Schifferes, US Names 'Coalition of the Willing,' BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm (last visited Jan.7, 2003) The United States'
government lists forty eight countries in their "Coalition of the Willing. Coalition Members, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327- 10.html. (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
2. See Jordan J. Paust, ASIL Insights: The U.S. as Occupying Power over Portion of Iraq and
Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl02.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2004).
3. See Id. (explaining the primacy of fact as the test of whether or not occupation exists). The
regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land annexed to the Hague Convention of 1899
stipulate that territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.
4. Dana Milbank & Robin Wright, Off the Mark on Cost of War, Reception by Iraqis, WASH.
POST, March 19, 2004, at Al.
5. The debates mainly concern the interpretation of relevant U.N. resolutions and the legality of
pre-emptive self-defense. See generally Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations
After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003); Michael Kelly, Time Warp to 1945 - Resurrection of Reprisal
and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrinesin InternationalLaw, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2003);
Ronald C. Santopadre, Note, DeteriorationOf Limits On The Use of Force and Its Perils: A Rejection
Of The Kosovo Precedent, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 369 (2003); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The
Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, The Fallof
Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576
(2003); John Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003).
6. See, e.g. Franck supra note 5, at 611-12 (rejecting the U.S. arguments that the invasion of
Iraq was authorized by Security Council resolutions).
7. See id. at 608.
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allegedly imminent threat of the Hussein government that justified the use of force
in self-defense.8 It is even suggested that international law should accept a new
paradigm of "collective duty" to prevent unruly regimes from threatening global
security with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 9
However, there is another important question that one needs to address: how
to end the war. There seems to be a long way to go before peace and stability
replace the current turmoil in Iraq, and the intermittent violence directed against
the occupying powers ceases. 10 Nevertheless, the challenge of restoring public
order and safety has come to the forefront, which appropriately leads to question,
"How does the Coalition end the war?"
The main motivation for the United States and its allies was to remove the
"alleged threat" to international peace and security posed by the former Iraqi
leader, Saddam Hussein, in the form of his ostensible WMD programs. 1 No one
would deny that the future reconstruction of Iraq should be aimed at enabling the
Iraqi people to freely pursue freedom and economic recovery. Moreover, the new
Iraq needs to address the issue of the long-standing divisions among diverse
internal sectarian groups, the Shi'ites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds, in order to build a
stable social and political structure serving the peoples' needs. 12 Therefore, the
dual tasks of (1) completely eliminating all sources of threat and (2) reconstructing
Iraq to serve the interest of its people are fundamental issues to address. The
answer to the question "how to end the war?" may be found by undertaking a
thorough analysis of the legal implications of belligerent occupation. This is
appropriate since the current occupation is at a critical phase during which a new
foundation for the political and social systems will soon be established in the
devastated country.
The law of belligerent occupation provides a basic framework to determine
how, and to what extent, the rights of the Iraqi people should be protected as the
war nears its end. As the occupying power builds a new political and social
structure for Iraq, close attention must be directed to the Iraqi people's choices and
preferences. This U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1511 on October 16,

8. See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 578-82 (supporting the exercise of the right of preemptive
self-defense against Iraq); Yoo, supra note 5, at 567-74.
9. See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 136 (proposing a collective "duty to prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their
power from acquiring or using WMD").
10. See
The
Tyrant
in
Chains, THE
ECONOMIST,
Dec.
16,
2003,
at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm? StoryID=2295809 (explaining that, although
Saddam Hussein was captured by the United States, the violence shows no sign of abating).
11. See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 349-52 (2002).
12. See Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi 'ites and the Future of Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 17
(explaining the history of Iraq, with a focus on the political division between the Shi'ites and the
Sunnis); Middle East: Iraqi Sunnis Feel Marginalized Under New U.S. Order, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Dec 23, 2003, availableat LEXIS, News Library, IPS-Inter Press Service file (explaining the
composition of the 25-member interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is already raising a
representation issue within Iraq, leaving many members of the Sunni community nervous about their
status).
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2003.13 The Resolution reaffirms the "right of the Iraqi people freely to determine
their own political future and control their own natural resources."' 4 Although the
Resolution does not explicitly mention the term 'self-determination,' it strongly
implies that self-determination is at issue. 5 In other words, one is faced with the
question of how to accommodate the right to self-determination within the context
of belligerent occupation.
The concept of self-determination was not salient at the time of conclusion of
the Hague' 6 and the Geneva Conventions 7 concerning the laws and customs of
war, which sought to regulate the status of the occupying powers.' 8 In fact, the
self-determination theory was once denounced as political rhetoric.' 9 Throughout
the twentieth century, however, the international community has gradually
accepted this theory as one of the most robust principles of international law. 20 It
is even believed to constitute a part ofjus cogens.2' Therefore, one needs to raise
and answer the question of self-determination in every belligerent occupation
context.
This article examines the rules of belligerent occupation and the status of the
right to self-determination in the contemporary era, focuses on their mutual
relationship at a normative level, and proposes that the right to self-determination
should be regarded as an important factor when applying the laws of belligerent
occupation. The article also argues that the right of the people to selfdetermination will limit the options of the occupying powers in managing the
political process in the occupied territory.

13. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1511 (2003).
14. Id.
15. See Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 823, 841-42 (2003).
16. See generally Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter "Hague Convention of 1907].
17. See generally, Geneva Convention, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter the "Geneva Convention of 1949"].
18. Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right Or Mere Rhetoric? 4 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 201, 202-03 (1997) (describing the major emergence of self-determination theory in 1916,
after the conventions of 1899 and 1907).
19. Id. at 202; Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A CriticalAnalysis of Current
InternationalLaw Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 26 (1992).
20. Mitchell A. Hill, What The Principle of Self-Determination Means Today, I ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 119, 120-23 (1995).
21. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 20708, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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STATUS OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

1. Modern rules relevantfor belligerent occupation
The earliest government codification of the laws of the war was the famous
Lieber Code, which was issued by the U.S. government in 1863.22 Modem
international law on belligerent occupation can be found in the 1907 Hague
Convention IV,23 "[r]especting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" together
with its Regulations, and the 1949 Geneva Convention (W),24 along with the 1977
Geneva Protocol 1.25 The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 resulted in
the conclusion of the Hague Conventions, which serve as "a general rule of
conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the
inhabitants. 26 The Hague Regulations annexed to the Convention also contain
provisions regulating belligerent occupation.27
World Wars I and II made it clear that a more comprehensive set of
international laws was necessary in order to prevent atrocities aimed at civilians
from occurring during hostilities.28 The Fourth Geneva Convention reflected such
an awareness of the international community.29 Today, the Convention is said to
apply universally as part of general international law.30 Although human rights
law was not a main theme of international law at the time the Fourth Geneva
Convention was concluded, the Convention is generally known as a "bill of rights"
for the people in occupied territories because it focuses on31 the protection of
civilians, rather than on the rights of the states engaged in war.
Article 3 provides for the minimum guarantee for fundamental human
rights,32 and Articles 27 through 34 specifically provide for the rights of
individuals.3 3 The rules in the Convention that relate to occupied territories also
reflect the need to protect civilians in such territories. 34

22. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origin and Limits of the
Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 213, 213 (1998); PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1997); Ardi Imseis,
On the Fourth Geneva Convention and The OccupiedPalestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65,
87 (2003).
23. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, § 1, Ch. 1, art. 1-3, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T.
LEXIS 29, at 17-18.
24. Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 17, part 1, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516,, at 1949 U.S.T.
LEXIS 484, at 2.
25. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89-92; Davis P. Goodman, The Needfor FundamentalChange in the
Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (1985).
26. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at
4.
27. Id. § III, arts. 42-56.
28. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89.
29. MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 113.
30. Id.
31. Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2003, at 18, 20. (explaining
that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were intended to empower the local population under occupation).
32. Paust, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 17, §111, art. 27-34, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 1949 U.S.T.
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What underlies the law of belligerent occupation is the idea that belligerent
occupation is a temporary condition, during which the belligerent occupant acts
only as the de facto administrative authority. 35 This thought is in line with the
Rousseau-Portales doctrine, which asserts that war is about sovereigns and armies,
not about subjects and civilians.36 Article 43 of the Hague Convention reiterates
the provisional nature of belligerent occupation because it obligates the occupant
to respect the laws that are in force in the occupied country.3 7
Belligerent occupation does not bring about any changes in sovereignty. The
ousted sovereign still retains de jure sovereignty. 38 The occupant assumes only de
facto control over the occupied territory without acquiring any sovereign rights or
entitlement. 39 The Hague Convention envisaged short-term occupations before the
conclusion of a peace treaty. 4° The occupying power should respect and maintain
the existing laws in force in the occupied territory. 41 According to Article 55, the
occupying state is to be "regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public
buildings, real estates, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile
State, and situated in the occupied country. '' 2
Since the Fourth Geneva Convention was not intended to replace the Hague
Conventions, the Hague rules continue to apply to belligerent occupation.4 3 Article
4 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention reaffirms that the occupation of a
territory does not affect the legal status of the territory in question. 44 Modem
international law has established rules on the comprehensive prohibition of the use
of force, but the law of belligerent occupation is still valid. Furthermore, it is
suggested that Hague and Geneva Conventions declare and constitute customary
international law.45 Irrespective of the legality a particular instance of the use of
force, the laws of war and belligerent occupation reflected in such Conventions are
binding on all parties to armed conflicts. 46
2. Belligerent Occupation: An analogy with overthrowing a legitimate
government
In considering the rights of the people under belligerent occupation, two
possibilities for comparison come forward. One is the accession of power by a de

LEXIS 484, at 21-24.
35. Goodman, supra note 25, at1581; Imseis, supra note 22, at 91.
36. Goodman, supra note 25, at 1579.
37. Hague Convention of 1907, supranote 16, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
38. Goodman, supra note 25, at 1580.
39. Id.
40. Nossel, supra note 31, at 18 (explaining the temporary nature of the belligerent occupation).
41. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, art. 43., 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29,
at 37.
42. Id.,art.45, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at 37.
43. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89-90.
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1,June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1151 U.N.T.S.
423.
45. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (4th ed. 1990).
46. See MALANCZUK, supranote 22, at 342-46.
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facto government after dismantling the previous regime.
The other is belligerent
occupation and accession of power by a de facto government involving the
subversion of the existing regime.48 Another useful comparison treats belligerent
occupation similar to colonial rule. This comparison works because colonial rule
entails foreign domination, as it was practiced in Asia and Africa during the early
twentieth century, in a manner akin to a belligerent occupying force.
These comparisons lead us to focus on the issue of self-determination as such.
A de facto government implies the notion of "internal" self-determination,49 since
the government in question often assumes that there has been a change of political
power, although on an unconstitutional basis. Constitutionality is not an absolute
or a dominant standard by which the will of people is to be measured, but such a
change of political power begs the question: what do the people desire? Colonial
rule is related to "external" self-determination, a principle by which a people's
status in, and relations with, the international society should be determined on its
own. The modem principle of self-determination was formulated as a result of the
global process of decolonization after World War 1. 50 Thus, political conditions
similar to those of people under colonial rule should be examined in the context of
self-determination.
When the law of belligerent occupation was codified in the international
forum during the early twentieth century, 51 the principle of self-determination had
yet to be recognized as a legal right. It was only after numerous resolutions by the
U.N. General Assembly that the self-determination principle seemed to have
gained the minimum level of opinio juris.52 The laws of belligerent occupation
and the right of self-determination developed independently of each other in
different historical and legal contexts. No matter how temporary belligerent
occupation is in nature, it denies the people the right to their own government.
Those occupied people have not given their prior consent and, therefore, the
consideration of the principle of self-determination in this context is relevant.
Before looking into the possible nexus between belligerent occupation and selfdetermination, it is necessary to examine the modem position of law on the latter.

47. A de facto government here, as opposed to de jure government, refers to a situation where
state power goes through abrupt changes by unconstitutional process such as military coup d'etat or
revolutions.
48. Belligerent occupation is regulated by the rules in The Hague Conventions and Regulations
and the Geneva Conventions, while de facto government is related to the law of recognition of
government and the principle of non-intervention into domestic affairs. BROwNLIE, supra note 45, at
90-92.
49. Internal self-determination is about people's choice of their own political system within
national boundaries. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How

WE USE IT, 117 (1994).
50. Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287,
1288 (1991).
51. See Goodman, supra note 25, at 1577-79 (describing how the modem rules of belligerent
occupation have evolved in international law).
52. MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 326-27.
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3. Self determination
The principle of self-determination, with its historical origin in the making of
nation-states, 3 is a relatively new concept in international law.54 Only after the
nineteenth century was the principle of self determination recognized as a
substantial political right on the global stage.55 At the end of the World War I,
Woodrow Wilson emphasized the importance of self-determination as a
56
fundamental principle for establishing long-lasting peace. The principle of self57
determination, however, did not receive widespread recognition at that time. The
League of Nations did not mention the principle of self-determination and refused
to apply this principle to the territories which were under Allied occupation after
World War 1.58 Furthermore, in the Aaland controversy, the International
Commission of Jurists issued an advisory opinion contending that "the right of
national groups... to separate themselves from the state" did not form part of
positive international law.59
After World War II, the U.N. Charter explicitly referred to the "principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 6 Through Articles 1 and 55 of the
Charter, self-determination together with the equal rights of peoples, constitute a
common principle but, as Rosalyn Higgins contends, the U.N. Charter does not
confer self-determination with an absolute status. 6 ' The Charter is concerned
about the "rights of the peoples of one state to be protected from interference by
other states... .'62 However, the articles on non-self-governing territories and
63
Selfinternational trusteeship do not contain the phrase "self-determination.
53. Chen, supra note 50, at 1288 (explaining that the concept of self-determination was born in
the 16th century with the emergence of the nation states).
54. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, in his essay "A Few Words on Non-Intervention,"
defended the self-determination of a community, probably on the same premises concerning personal
autonomy and freedom. See Michael J. Glennon, Self-Determination and Cultural Diversity, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 75-76 (2003) (stating that the defense of community autonomy may
actually undermine the personal autonomy when an oppressive community is protected against outside
intervention).
55. Eric Kolodner, The Futureof the Right to Self-Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 15455 (1994) (explaining that, as the principles of the new international order became more developed after
the formation of the United Nations, self-determination attained the status of an international legal
right).
56. Hill, supra note 20, at 121-22.
57. Id. Wilson's effort resulted only in "allowing for the adoption of special treaties for the
protection of minorities." J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination:
Prospects and Problemsfor a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 151, 159-60 (1999).
58. Hill, supranote 20, at 122.
59. Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major
Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J.INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 447 (1997) (quoting LEAGUE OF
NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 1,at 5 (1920)).
para. 2 and art 55.
60. U.N. CHARTER art.l,
61. Higgins explains that the concept of self-determination in the U.N. Charter did not include a
right of dependent peoples to independence. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 112.
62. Id.
63. There is only a reference to 'self government;' it is sometimes said that the U.N. Charter
'implicitly' recognized the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial rules but such an
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determination was neither about a legal right nor about dependent peoples. Many
jurists and governments seem to view self-determination, though enshrined in the
Charter, as a political fagade. 64
The practice of the U.N. bodies made self-determination a part of the law of
the United Nations. 65 In the 1950s, the U.N. General Assembly began to accept
self-determination as a right of the people. 66 The rise of self-determination to a
status of an enforceable legal right of "peoples" materialized as a result of the
decolonization process. 67 The "Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples" was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as a nonbinding resolution in 1961.68 That Declaration provided that all people under
colonial rule have the right to "freely determine their political status," which is
essentially the right to self-determination. 69 The 1960 Declaration, while
acknowledging the right to self-determination, emphasizes the territorial integrity
of states. 70 Although the colonial powers resisted the idea of self-determination as
a legal right, the right of people to decolonization became widely pervasive.71
Resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly are not legally binding on
member states but can be accepted as constituting or evidencing opinio juris.
Moreover, in one academic opinion, the72 Declaration of 1960 serves as "an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter."
It should be noted that self-determination became a right of the people and not
of a state. This distinction is clearer in the development of human rights law. The
two human rights covenants of 1966-the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights-include the right to self-determination in their respective first articles.73
This inclusion implies that self-determination is a human right existing outside of
the specific historical context of decolonization.74

interpretation seems to be based on what Higgins refers to as an incorrect 'popular assumption'. See id.
64. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 554. Brownlie says self-determination referred to in the U.N.
Charter was regarded as merely of hortatory effect, while Higgins goes a little further by stating that it
was not even about dependent peoples. HIGGINS, supranote 49, at 112-14.
65. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 554.

66. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 113; Cass, supra note 19, at 24-26 (stating that the acceptance of
self-determination was reflected in the U.N. Charter and a series of resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly).
67. Chen, supranote 50, at 1289.
68. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
69. Id.
70. This emphasis on territorial integrity is relied on by many who object to a right to secession of
a minority group within a state. See HIGGINS supra note 49, at 124; Derege Demissie, SelfDetermination Including Secession vs. The TerritorialIntegrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case
for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 165, 169 (1996).
71. HIGGINS, supranote 49, at 113.
72. See Taryn Ranae Tomasa, Comment, Ho'Olahui: The Rebirth ofA Nation, 5 ASIAN L.J. 247,
263 (1998).
73. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
74. HIGGINS, supranote 49, at 114-15.
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General Assembly Resolution 2625, the "Declaration of Principles on
Friendly Relations," which was adopted in 1970, 75 is another important document
emphasizing the right to self-determination. Self-determination was pronounced to
take various forms: it may be "independence," "free association," "integration with
' 76
The
an independent state," or "emergence into any other political status.
77
essential idea to note is that people are given a choice. The Declaration of 1970
states that self-determination is not only a right to decolonization, but also a right
781
to be free from foreign domination.
Nothing in the Friendly Relations Declaration is to be construed to undermine
"the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent states [that
are] conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of... selfdetermination and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory. '79 This language in the Declaration seems to result in a
couple of different interpretations. In one view, the wording seems to suggest the
principle of democracy, or 'internal' self-determination. 80 A more extreme way of
interpreting the Declaration can be drawn from the proposition that supports the
supremacy of the right to secession over territorial integrity in instances of
government oppression and harassment of minorities within its national
boundaries.
Self-determination beyond the context of decolonization has been a source of
8
trouble for some countries and has been a subject of heated debates. ' The issue
has been presented in the form of opposition between respect for territorial
integrity of states and the right of self-determination, including the right to
secede. 2 States challenged with issues of minority factions within their territorial

75. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
76. Id.
77. Hill, supra note 20, at 128; Eric Ting-lun Huang, The Evolution of the Concept of SelfDetermination And the Right of the People of Taiwan to Self-Determination, 14 N.Y. NT'L L. REV.
167, 193 (2001).
78. See HiGGINs, supra note 49, at 116 (referring to foreign domination reflected the situations in
Palestine and Afghanistan).
79. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
80. Nanda, supra note 59, at 445-46 (noting that internal self-determination refers to a democratic
form of government with wider participation).
81. Steve R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti PossidetisAnd the Borders of New States, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 590 (1996).
82. Self-determination and secession are intertwined with the concept of uti possidetis. Uti
possidetis, which provides that "states emerging from decolonization shall inherit the colonial
administrative borders that they held at the time of independence," served as a useful guideline for those
seeking liberation from colonial rule, but may at the same time endanger global order by leaving certain
minority groups unstable and stimulating secessionist movements. See id.
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borders fear that the principle of self-determination might motivate minority
groups to pursue secession. 83 The United Nations, however, has been84resolute and
consistent in excluding secession from the right to self-determination.
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is another
authoritative source in favor of the right to self-determination. In an advisory
opinion on Namibia, the ICJ stated that self-determination was made applicable to
all people as a result of "the subsequent development of international law" on nonself-governing territories. 85 In the Western Sahara case, the ICJ also endorsed the
right of the people to determine their political status by their "freely expressed
86
will."

More recent pronouncements are present in the East Timor case.87 In 1991,
Portugal, as the administering power of East Timor, instituted proceedings against
Australia concerning the latter's activities with respect to East Timor. 88 Portugal
asked the ICJ to declare that Australia had failed to respect the duties of Portugal
as the administering power and the right of the people of East Timor to selfdetermination.89
The ICJ dismissed Portugal's claims on the ground that in the absence of the
consent of Indonesia, a third state, accepting the application would violate the
rights and obligations of Indonesia. 90 In its judgment, however, the ICJ declared
that self-determination is "one of the essential principles of contemporary

83. Self-determination has inspired bitter debates on secession of minorities. For example,
secession of Bangladesh is an exceptional case to some. Nanda, supra note 59, at 450. Some others,
however, regard it as an example of secession by the operation of a right to self-determination. Chen,
supra note 50, at 1292-93. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and experiences in Eastern
Europe has added to the controversy. The view supporting right to secession based on the interpretation
of the Declaration of 1970 seems a little flawed. Apart from the Declaration of 1970, which is legally
non-binding in itself, there is not enough state practice supporting a right to secession, and the principle
of territorial integrity seems to prevail over such a putative right. A more appropriate approach may be
that secession is regarded as one political option to protect certain minority group in extreme
circumstances. It is one thing to suggest secession as a legal right, and another to suggest it as a political
alternative.
84. This determination probably reflects the weight carried by the principle of territorial integrity
in the U.N. Charter. Also, it may be that the threat of rampant secession endangers international peace
and security; the very values the United Nations was created to protect. See Kolodner, supra note 55, at
159-60 (stating that granting the right to secede would produce a highly fragmented and politically
unstable international system).
85. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
86. Western Sahara, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 12 (Oct. 16).
87. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
88. Natalie S. Klein, Multilateral Disputes and the Doctrine of Necessary Parties in the East
Timor Case, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 305, 305-11 (1996) (explaining that the core of the dispute was
Indonesia's military invasion of the former Portuguese colony of Timor in 1975).
89. ConcerningEast Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 92.
90. This was the result of application of the so-called Monetary Gold principle. Under the
principle, the ICJ cannot adjudicate a dispute where the interests of a state not consenting to the court's
jurisdiction constitute the very subject matter of the dispute. Klein, supra note 88, at 313.
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international law." 91 Portugal asserted that the rights of people to selfdetermination had an erga omnes character, meaning that the rights involve the
92
obligations to the international community as a whole.
The ICJ was of the
93
opinion that Portugal's argument was "irreproachable."
The ICJ did not give its opinions on the implications of the erga omnes
character of self-determination. However, many academics regard the principle of
self-determination as a jus cogens norm in modem international law. 94 The
tendency to label self-determination as jus cogens reflects the position of modem
law on the comprehensive prohibition of colonization by the use or the threat of
force. However, labeling is not the end of the problem. As the exact boundaries of
self-determination are controversial, 95 so too is the result of giving the principle of
self-determination a special status in international law.96 Another important aspect
of self-determination is that it forms one factor that constitutes the theory of
democratic governance in international law.97 According to Thomas Franck, selfdetermination "has evolved into a more general notion of internationally validated
political consultation., 98 This line of argument places more emphasis on internal
self-determination than on its external aspect relating to decolonization and
91. Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102. In his separate opinion, Judge Vereshchetin
stressed the importance of the views of the people of East Timor with regard to the whole case.
According to his analysis, after the adoption of the Declaration of 1960 on the Granting of
Independence, the Administering Power has a duty to consult the people of a non-self-governing
territory when "the matter at issue directly concerned that people." Separate Opinion of Judge
Vereshchetin, id. at 138.
92. Portugal aimed to show that the 'Monetary Gold' principle was not applicable in a case where
rights erga omnes were at issue, but the Court did not accept the argument, stating the erga omnes
character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction were "two different things ".Id. at 102.
93. Id.
94. Jus cogens, a peremptory norm, has a firm place in modem international law. According to
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), "a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Nov. 8, 1972, art. 53, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3237, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698, The International Law
Commission (ILC) states that a right to self-determination is one of few accepted peremptory norms of
international law. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
supra note 21, at 208, at U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). According to the ILC, jus cogens and erga omnes
rules are almost identical, only with different focuses. While peremptory norms of general international
law focus on the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the
focus of obligations to the international community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all
States in compliance being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach. Id. at 277-78.
95. Many questions remain unanswered: Is self-determination only about independence, or is it a
principle of a continuing application? Do minorities have the right to secession under circumstances?
96. For example, are the rights of minorities to secession also ajus cogens norm? If so, what is the
status of the principle of territorial integrity of states? It is also related to other fundamental principles
such as human rights and international peace. Is the exercise of self-determination that violates human
rights acceptable? Or, is the use of force in pursuit of self-determination justifiable?
97. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992) (explaining that the entitlement to democracy in international law has its root in the
normative entitlement to self-determination).
98. Id. at 55.
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nationalism. In other words, self-determination is associated with the victory of
liberal democracy all over the world. Self-determination, however, is also said to
have contributed to the "undemocratic climate in which ethnic-nationalism.., has
blossomed into a new, totally credible force" in international politics. 99

Ill. SELF-DETERMINATION

AND BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION

Applicability of self-determination in the context of belligerentoccupation
As demonstrated above self-determination is not an idealistic, rhetorical
slogan but a legal right stemming from specific historical experience. The
principle, as it stands now, is a legal invention produced to deal with the
decolonization process after the establishment of the United Nations.100 It is not a
sacred, God-given right of natural law but a legal conception that resulted from
historical struggles and compromises. It is noteworthy that even the U.N. Charter,
one of the most important instruments for the protection of human rights, failed10to1
directly associate self-determination with decolonization and national liberation.
Therefore, it may be rather demanding to state that everyone is entitled to the right
Nevertheless, contemporary
to self-determination under all circumstances.
belligerent occupation may serve as an appropriate setting for the application of the
established doctrine of self-determination.
The right of people to self-determination may be realized in many forms,
including independence and association with other groups in a federal or nonfederal state.1 0 2 In this regard, a theoretical question arises: "Is self-determination
to be regarded as 'consumed' once a choice is made?" In case of association, this
turns into a controversy on whether the right to self-determination includes a right
to secession.1 0 3 A more general aspect of the question surfaces when people
choose to establish an independent state, a decision that most peoples have actually
made.' 4 Then, is self-determination exhausted once independence is achieved? It
may be said that from the moment when independence is achieved, sovereignty
and equal rights of a state start to take effect.10 5 A state is given sovereign rights
and legal guarantees under international law. In the normal conduct of state
affairs, then, does self-determination disappear? The answer is no.

99. Russell A. Miller, Self-determination in InternationalLaw and the Demise of Democracy?, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 608 (2003).
100. Kolodner, supra note 55, at 155 (explaining the development of the concept of selfdetermination after the World War II).
101. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 111-12 (stating that the U.N. Charter focused on the right of the
sovereign member states).
102. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 553.
103. Where a people chose to associate with other groups in an existing state, the right of that
people to self-determination should probably be regarded as assimilated to the right of the whole people
of that state. The right to secession is not about continuous applicability of self-determination, but about
who is entitled to self-determination.
104. HIGINS, supra note 49, at 113-14.
105. See U.N. CHARTER, arts.l(2), 55.
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International law confers equal sovereignty upon a state-a state is a
'subject,' or a distinct actor of international law. 0 6 Sovereign rights are given to a
state, which is different from 'people' in the eyes of international law.'0 7 On the
contrary, self-determination is a right of the people, not of a state, and the right
continues to exist as long as that group of people exists, whether they constitute a
state governing entity or whether that group remains under colonial rule. 10 8 It may
be said that the sovereignty of a state and the right of people to self-determination
exist in parallel with each other. When the sovereignty of a state is invoked
against colonialism, the right of people to self-determination is to be invoked as
well. In this type of scenario, the right to self-determination would come to the
forefront, although such a situation cannot legally destroy sovereignty of an
occupied state. In short, the right to self-determination-a right for people "to
choose for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to other
groups"°9-always lies with the people, not with the state.
The U.N. Charter stipulates that friendly relations between states should be
based on self-determination, and that states must respect the principle of selfdetermination in continuing mutual relations."o The 1966 Covenants also provide
for a right to self-determination as a human right,"' which is attached to
individuals and not consumed as a result of political changes. Therefore, it is only
logical to state that people have the ongoing right to self-determination under all
12
Accordingly, there is
circumstances, even in instances of foreign domination.'
no reason to exclude self-determination from consideration of the rights of
civilians in a territory under belligerent occupation. In Security Council Resolution
1511,113 however, there is no direct reference to self-determination, which reflects
the fact that self-determination as a legal right beyond the historical process of
decolonization has yet to be fully acknowledged.' 14
The nature of belligerent occupation is similar to conditions of colonial rule
and has the potential of developing into a new form of colonialism. Belligerent
occupation imposes a kind of de facto government in the occupied territory. This
de facto component, as opposed to a de jure component relied upon by a sitting
authority, indicates that people under belligerent occupation are entitled to the right
106. A state is identifiable as a unit upon which international law confers various rights and duties.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 58-59.
107. Id.
108. As Higgins pointed out, the U.N. Charter provided for self-determination as a right of states,
not of peoples, but the subsequent practice of the UN changed the situations. See HIGGINS, supra note
49, at 111-21.
109. BROWNLIE, supranote 46, at 595.
110. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 and art. 55.
111. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 114-15.

112. Foreign domination is still a source of disputes. For example, the occupation of Jerusalem by
Israel has caused serious controversies about Israeli sovereignty and the self-determination of the
community of citizens of Palestine. See John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
765, 774-80 (1996).
113. See S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844 (2003).
114. In some cases of alien occupation, as with Afghanistan in 1987, the United Nations did refer to
the right to self-determination. See HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 116.
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to self-determination. This assertion does not mean that belligerent occupation has
created a de novo right to self-determination for people to be protected under the
laws of war. The right of people to choose their political future continues to exist
whether or not there is a normal, non-wartime, government in place.
When The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions were concluded
in 1907 and 1949 respectively, the international community was not in the position
to foresee that the principle of self-determination could have evolved to its current
form. It was only after the practice of the United Nations in 1950s and 1960s that
the principle of self-determination was accepted as a part of international law." 5
The U.N. Charter was in force at the time of the conclusion of the Geneva
Conventions but the Charter was ambiguous about the concept of selfdetermination. 1 6 Consequently, there was no place for self-determination in the
making of the law of belligerent occupation.
Given the status and the meaning of self-determination that is firmly
established in modem international law, re-evaluating the duties of the occupying
powers, and the rights of the people in occupied territories, becomes important.
There is a prima facie contradiction between a people's right to self-determination
and the existence of belligerent occupation. Belligerent occupation, although
temporary in nature, has obtained ruling power not based on the people's will.
Thus, the law of belligerent occupation needs to be revised or, at least reinterpreted in a way that incorporates the concept of self-determination which
developed independently of international wartime law.
2. Occupation At War in Light of Self-Determination
The first issue needing clarification is the basic relationship between
belligerent occupation and self-determination. Belligerent occupation is not a result
of the exercise of a people's right to choose their own political destiny, thus, it
follows that belligerent occupations contravene the principle of self-determination.
Does it follow, then, that belligerent occupation should be legally prohibited? This
is the same question facing the rules of war.'1 7 Today, war, as a means of state
policy, is illegal, and the prohibition of the use of force lies at the core of modem
international law." 8 The use of force is only lawful when it is used for the

115. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 595 (explaining that self-determination had not been a positive
principle of law before the United Nations tackled the issue of decolonization).
116. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 111-12.
117. See MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 306 (explaining the principle that the rules governing the
actual conduct of armed conflict are applicable in cases of armed conflict, whether the conflict is lawful
or unlawful under the rules governing the resort to armed conflict).
118. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112-122
(1963) [hereinafter "The Use of Force"]; MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 309-11.
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purposes of legitimate self-defense or when the U.N. Security Council authorizes
such a use, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter." 9 Once an armed
conflict occurs, however, the laws of war begin to impose themselves on every
party to the conflict.120 An aggressor is to be judged in the light of international
humanitarian law and the laws of war, which present issues separate from
responsibility for the breach of peace.
In theory, the principle of self-determination immediately makes any
belligerent occupation illegal, because occupation is inevitably against the will of
the people in the occupied territory.
Considering that the right to selfdetermination is a peremptory norm of international law, the illegality of the very
existence of belligerent occupation seems more plausible. The jus cogens
character of the principle of self-determination would disallow every situation that
is in violation of the principle. It may be said that belligerent occupation, which
violates the core value of people's right to self-determination is simply not
permitted.' 2' This theoretical prohibition, however, does not deprive the Hague
and Geneva Conventions of their raison d'6tre.
When actual belligerent occupation occurs in the course of an armed conflict,
certain rules of protection and preservation are to be applied. These rules are
found in the Hague 22 and Geneva laws. 23 Those who violate the rules of
belligerent occupation are responsible for their breaches without regard to the
lawfulness of their acts at the initial phase of armed conflicts.' 24 Therefore, the
question comes down to how to incorporate the principle of self-determination into
the context of armed conflicts and the subsequent belligerent occupation. In other

119. There are some other forms of use of force, such as humanitarian intervention, which some
suggest international law accepts as legitimate. The debates surrounding the legality of humanitarian
intervention are mainly about the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and the formation of
customary international law. See BROWNL1E, supra note 45, at 564-71; Maxine Marcus, Humanitarian
Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent Occupation or Colonialism?, 25 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 99, 103
(2002).
120. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 564-71; Marcus, supra note 119, at 103.
121. This proposed prohibition of belligerent occupation has yet to be accepted by the actual state
practice. The legality of belligerent occupation seems to remain integrated with the legality of the initial
use of force that resulted in that occupation. It is also to be reminded that, where states representing the
international community impose measures of security on a country for its certain internationally
wrongfil acts such as aggression, the principle of self-determination, in the form of due consultation of
the people, may be precluded. See BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 169-71. Movement of populations and
frontier changes, which are definitely against the will of the people concerned, may be pursued in the
wake of a war of sanction to prevent future threats to the peace. See The Use of Force, supra note 118,
at 409. Similarly, if the U.S-led multinational forces are regarded in their exercise of occupation and
reconstruction of Iraq as enforcing the decisions of the international community or of the United
Nations, their acts concerning the belligerent occupation can be more easily justified.
122. See generally Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS
29.
123. See generally Geneva Convention of 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, at 1949 U.S.T. Lexis 484.
124. "A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation it shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces." Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2277, at
1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at 17-18.
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words, how is self-determination balanced with belligerent occupation? The
purpose of the laws of belligerent occupation is to protect civilians and to restore
order and security in the occupied territory. 125 Minimizing or preventing miserable
conditions inflicted upon civilians is the underlying rationale behind the modem
126
laws of war, and the relevant rules are based on humanitarian needs and causes.
One practical approach to reflect self-determination in this area of wartime
law is to restrict the temporal span of belligerent occupation.' 27 It should be
understood that belligerent occupation should not exceed a certain minimum
period of time. The longer the occupation continues, the more the principle of selfdetermination is undercut. Fixing a time limit in an inflexible form is probably
unrealistic and ineffective because so much depends on the actual conditions of
each armed conflict and on specific military needs. As a general principle though,
it should be expressly acknowledged that belligerent occupation should continue
for the shortest period of time necessary so that the preservation and the exercise of
self-determination by the people under occupation is not undermined. Once this
concrete factors that take into consideration
general principle is established, more
128
considered.
be
can
cases
individual
Limiting the duration of belligerent occupation, however, is not a sufficient
application of the principle of self-determination to fundamentally illegal situations
of foreign domination. Another general principle that needs to be adopted is that
belligerent occupation, as long as it exists, should be a temporary process so that
self-determination is truly realized. Given that self-determination is a principal
factor undermining the legitimacy of belligerent occupation, the final result of
occupation should be to lay down the necessary conditions under which the people
in the occupied territory can build their own government-one based on a freely
expressed will. Helping a country to rebuild itself on its own is not an easy task; it
is a much more daunting challenge when the country in question is a hostile enemy
under the belligerent occupation, because the occupant has its own needs, such as
ensuring security.
The recent experience in the reconstruction of several African nations and the
Balkan areas after civil conflicts shows the practically insurmountable obstacles
129
facing a belligerent occupier, even in the absence of widespread armed conflict.

125. Nossel, supra note 31, at 20; Imseis, supranote 22, at 91.
126. See MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 342-46.

127. Some people believe that rules on belligerent occupation are too idealistic to expect states to
observe, and that they need to be revised to accommodate reality of wars. See Goodman, supra note 25,
at 1581. However, what is more important and urgent is to reflect human rights including selfdetermination in the existing laws of belligerent occupation.
128. E.g., S.C. Res.1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844 (2003) (urging the
Coalition Provisional Authority to return governing authorities to the Iraqi people "as soon as
practicable").
129. See Ruth Wedgewood & Harold K. Jacobson, State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict:
Foreword,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2001).
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The precise methodology of reconstruction and self-determination cannot be dealt
with here, but worthy of note are the two correlated aspects of the proposed
general principle that belligerent occupation should be about securing selfdetermination of the people under occupation.
First, in enabling people to exercise self-determination, the occupying powers
may have to be allowed to introduce changes to the existing structures of the
occupied society. The law of belligerent occupation is based on the temporary
nature of occupation and provides that the occupant should respect the laws in
force.' 30
Sometimes, however, the existing elements of socio-political
organization of the occupied territory may fundamentally preclude any notion of
self-determination. 13 1 In this case, it may not be appropriate to allow the existing
conditions to continue. The belligerent occupier may also have to establish proper
32
legal and political systems in order to enable people to represent themselves.
This general statement on the necessary changes that need to be introduced leads
us to the second aspect of the principle of self-determination that has to be applied
to belligerent occupation.
Belligerent occupants should resist the temptation to excessively "nation
build." The term nation building usually refers to a reconstruction strategy with
the goal of bringing about durable peace in a state that has suffered from internal
ethnic or religious conflicts. 133 It is often said that the reconstruction of failed
societies requires more than foreign economic aid, and the notion of nation
or wars, to
building refers to helping dysfunctional states, devastated by civil strife
34
build the political institutions that make future development possible.
Recognition that financial aid is fruitless where decent governance is not
present, inspired the West to focus on nation-building in the reconstruction of
chaotic states. 135 Nation-building implies a deeper involvement in the domestic
conduct of political affairs. 36 Planting specific democratic institutions in a certain
country, for example, is a more realistic way to help that country to get out of
poverty and political chaos, instead of simply distributing donated funds. 1 37 The
use of nation-building is also perceived as an effective means to fight against the

130. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16,art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at
37.
131. Id.
132. In Iraq, the Governing Council was composed to represent the Iraqi people. See CNN, Iraqi
30,
2003),
at
No
Longer
a
Threat
(July
Official:
Saddam
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/07/30/sprj.irq.main/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
133. Quynh-Nhu Vuong, U.S. Peacekeepingand Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self-Interested
Multilateralism, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 804, 804-06 (2003) (explaining that peacekeeping operations
are increasingly intertwined with nation building designed to lay the foundations for a durable peace in
regions devastated by civil conflicts).
134. See Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Casefor
American Empire, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 4.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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But when applying nation-building to a state under
threats of terrorism.
belligerent occupation, the fundamental question to ask is: how compatible is the
principle of nation building with the principle of self-determination? The answer
to this question cannot rule out the notion of nation building but should consider
the inherent risks of such a concept.
Nation building efforts are likely to undermine the right to self-determination
in a country under belligerent occupation. Political institutions may be chosen and
implemented by the occupying powers with the intention of destroying any
elements that look intrinsically hazardous to the belligerent occupants.

139

The

building of national institutions has to stop short of the total implementation of
specific extraneous political systems, and should focus on the establishment of
basic conditions for the exercise of self-determination. 140 Therefore, occupying
powers need to strike a reasonable balance between no involvement and too much
involvement, when attempting nation-building.
IV. CONCLUSION

Today, the principle of self-determination has the potential to outlaw
belligerent occupation altogether. Belligerent occupation, once it occurs, should
be subject to limitations imposed by the operation of the principle of selfdetermination.
Since belligerent occupation violates the principle of selfdetermination, the end of the occupation should foster the right to selfdetermination. Self-determination may call for an early end to the occupation and
may obligate the occupants to secure the necessary conditions to implement the
political choice of the occupied peoples. These implications must be legally
recognized so that belligerent occupation will not turn into neocolonialism. In
terms of the laws of belligerent occupation, occupying powers should be allowed
to make minimal changes to the existing political conditions of the occupied
society. At the same time, however, too much involvement in the name of nation
building may hurt the core elements of self-determination.
The question of how to end the war in Iraq is to be answered by bearing in
mind such normative relations between self-determination and belligerent
occupation. The United States and its allies established the interim Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC), wherein various internal sectors of the Iraqi society were
supposedly represented.141On January 30, 2005, the historic Iraqi election took
place, leading to formation of the new government effectively replacing the IGC.
Since most Sunnis did not participate in the January election, 142 it remains to be

138. Vuong, supra note 133, at 821-22.

139. Id.
140. Post-Cold War experiences led foreign aid donors to seek to build in aided countries political
parties, law courts, police forces, central banks and newspapers, etc. See Mallaby, supra note 134, at 4.
It is practically impossible to define a category of institutions that are compatible with selfdetermination of the population involved, but it may be said that consultation with the people and
appropriate international bodies would be useful in finding solutions to these sensitive matters.
141. See Patrick E. Tyler & Richard A. Oppel Jr., After the War: Occupation,N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2003, at A11.
142. The Conflict in Iraq: Election; Shiite Coalition Takes A Big Lead in the Iraq Vote, N.Y.
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seen whether the new government can enjoy political legitimacy, which is essential
to political and social integration of a majority Shia, Kurds, and Sunns. The
government has a responsibility to write a permanent Constitution of Iraq
hopefully by mid-August
of 2005, pursuant to which a new general election is to
143
take place soon.
Considering the proposed principle that belligerent occupation should endow
people with the right to self-determination, the formation of the new government
could possibly serve as a stimulus for a complicated process for rebuilding Iraq by
Iraqi's own will. The occupying powers, especially the United States, may be
tempted to accomplish a short-term political goal of establishing a pro-U.S.
government with which they can easily deal; this is of concern to many. 144 It
seems rather dangerous to try to impose certain political systems of U.S. choosing
and supporting specific sects more responsive to such systems, because this
practice would probably aggravate the existing political division among the
religious and ethnic groups within Iraq.145 The final destiny of the Iraqi people
should be left in their own hands. The principle of self-determination must be the
primary factor in making every decision concerning Iraq's. status. A feasible
development strategy may be possible only after the Iraqi people are satisfied with
the exercise of their right to self-determination. It should be noted, however, that
self-determination is required, not because it warrants success of democracy for the
Iraqi people, but because it is to be applied as a legal rule. It is true that selfdetermination is a theoretical starting point for democratic governance, 46 but the
principle of self-determination could arouse ethnic or nationalist awareness, which
could end up rejecting the idea of democracy. 147 The distinction between external
and internal self-determination shows these opposing perspectives. Given the
current situation, it is likely that claims for self-determination lean toward an
external aspect of the principle that emphasizes an absence of outside
interferences.
The principle of self-determination may hamstring or halt the necessary
economic reconstruction and political development toward democracy.
Nevertheless, the United States and its allies must accept the reality that the rights
of the people under occupation impose fundamental restrictions on the
management of that occupation.

TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2005, at Al.
143. Iraq Legislators Set Up Panelto Draft a Consitution, N.Y. TiMEs, May 11, 2005, at A9; U.S.
Presses Iraqi Government To Broaden the Role of Sunnis, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 2005, at A11.
144. Tyler & Oppel, supranote 141.
145. Id.
146. See Franck, supra note 97, at 52-54.
147. See Miller, supra note 99, at 608.

